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Introduction
The Administrative Office of the Trial Court sponsored the Massachusetts Office of
Dispute Resolution (MODR) at the University of Massachusetts Boston to prepare this
working paper depicting the state of research on alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 1, 2 ,
3, 4
for the purpose of compiling an evidence base for public funding of court ADR
programs.
The format of the paper is a summary of research and an outline of decision-making
models for legislators and budget analysts. To inform this work, a workshop was held
with directors of court-connected community mediation centers focused on
communicating the value of mediation services to the state. Now, as a Working Paper,
this work will be employed as a guide by the Trial Court Standing Committee on Dispute
Resolution and court ADR programs for planning implementation and funding strategy. 5
The term “Working Paper” implies launching a process of inquiry and planning.
This paper is presented in a style similar to advising a senior executive making an
investment decision. There is therefore a “return on investment” orientation to the
Working Paper. We brought to bear an outside, management science perspective as
recommended in the Monan Report 6 . In contrast to that report this is an operational level
analysis. We suggest readers review that report first, if they have not done so already, as
it outlines the executive level, strategic thinking about advancing the court system – a
regime within which court-connected ADR must operate.
While the Monan Report outlines recommendations for improvement of the judiciary,
recommendations specific to ADR are not included. Operational recommendations for
ADR are yet to be developed. In addition, the implementation of ADR should be included
in service and outcome evaluation systems deployed in the court.
There is a need now to integrate this work with the formation of Trial Court policy on
court-connected ADR, in the context of actions taken in response to the Monan report,
such as time standards for case management, and then aligning this with the legislative
budget decision process.
The basic idea of this Working Paper is to encourage a broad overview of the field rather
than emphasizing details of particular research projects (i.e., the purpose of this summary
is insight not numbers). The last compilation of information on the value of ADR for the
state was completed in February 1998, “Report to the Legislator on the Impact of
Alternative Dispute Resolution on the Massachusetts Trial Court.” The present work
draws on more than twice as many studies. At this time they are provided as a roughly
70-page annotated bibliography in draft form. For the purpose of compiling a larger
collection of summary data, the Working Paper draws to a large extent on the work of
other reviewers of the field.
This data is presented, in this Working Paper, in a framework to enable a yes/no decision
for budget decision-makers. This is done by dividing the analysis into a set of simpler
models and asking whether the investment in ADR makes sense based on each model
taken individually; then tallying the votes. This approach makes the task of interpreting
this data simpler for the reader. In other words, one could look at the data for each model
and ask whether the data tends to lean on the side of a return on investment or not?
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Formal decision analysis in this regard, would necessarily take into account the risk
adversity / risk affinity of the decision maker(s). For the purpose of this Working Paper, a
risk adverse position is generally adopted, reflecting a conservative approach to the
budget decision. The conservative stance entails setting reasonable expectations
regarding benefits and assessing the potential of the downside or loss.
There is very little formal evaluation data specific to Massachusetts court-connected
ADR that is less than seven years old. So too, there does not appear to be a substantial
record of evaluation of pertinent performance measures of the judicial system that would
permit a comparative analysis. Massachusetts is not however unusual in this regard. 7
The strength of the existing data in the field is in establishing some bounds on the
distribution of results of implementing ADR. The implementation of ADR in
Massachusetts is not monolithic; it is largely left up to each court and the initiative of
local ADR practitioners. So considering the broad distribution of results of ADR studies
in the field would probably more accurately reflect the distribution of results to expect
within Massachusetts than a particular study of a program in one or several
Massachusetts courts. It is reasonable to presume that Massachusetts’ implementation of
ADR would perform within the bounds of those distributions. Massachusetts has a
longstanding history of implementing ADR in various programs throughout the state.
Based on their previously adjudicated success, a number of these programs, such as the
Multi-Door Courthouse and the court ADR programs of the Massachusetts Office of
Dispute Resolution, have served as models for other states. These programs then served
as subjects in further research. So, in the absence of timely Massachusetts specific data,
and in the interest of more realistically representing the distribution of expected results
than can be inferred from data studies of several Massachusetts specific programs, we
adopt the technique of portfolio analysis. This is a technique very common in the
investment community and increasingly applied within organizations for their own
projects. 8 Some of the parlance in the following pages is drawn from this realm, for
example, “risk” 9 and “uncertainty,” 10 “aversion to loss,” “return on investment,” and so
forth.
The analysis which follows is course-grained. It is analyzed with respect to sensitivity to
variation in the results reported in studies as they pertain to the effect on the yes/no
answer on the pertinent model. A benefit of the portfolio approach is that the broad
distribution of results in the data set accommodates the variation in performance
objectives of the court system, and situational differences of individual courts. A value in
the analysis is surfacing considerations regarding the assumptions of the decision-maker.
The modularity of the approach, and affinity of models with different performance
objectives, enables weighting according to legislative or court system’s policy directives.
We note the resource commitment to this endeavor has been two and a half person weeks
sponsored by the Trial Court and four person weeks contributed by MODR of work
conducted over a two month period. The project also enjoyed the contribution of over
thirty people as listed in the acknowledgements section. It also enabled MODR to engage
other researchers with an interest in the nature of this work.
In preparing the following analysis over one thousand documents were assembled in
electronic form with full-text indexing providing an ongoing resource for research.
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In closing please note that the author does not consider that the above compilation
constitutes research in the field of ADR. While it might be considered to be within the
realm of meta-analysis, the work at this stage is overly reliant on secondary resources,
sacrifices distinction-making amongst cases in favor of broad managerial overview, and
sacrifices statistical nuance in favor of presenting a view of the field to the non-scientist.
These are limitations with respect to the strictures of scientific method. The purpose of
this work is rapid assembly of a decision-making tool to foster structured dialogue
amongst the court, community mediation centers, and budget decision-makers.
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Overview
The purpose of framing the research in the following models is to assist the court and its
court-connected mediation programs in their ongoing dialogue with the funding decisionmakers in addressing the question: Is state funding of community mediation centers and
court ADR generally a worthwhile investment? As a means of setting forth components
of an analytic framework, the following simplified financial models are offered to draw
out salient aspects of the nature of the investment. The simplified models are employed
primarily for the purpose of illustrating the investment in terms of classic financial
models familiar to a budget analyst. These models intend to provide guidance in framing
the funding decision. They are presented from a conservative stance – that is guiding
where there are good levels of certainty, low levels of risk, and low downside, regarding
return on investment.

Simplified Model 1: ADR Services Viewed as Outsourced
Contractual Services
Introduction
Suppose that the state contribution to community mediation centers were viewed as a
contract to provide mediation services to the courts. A simplified input output model over
time is drawn from the Administrative Office of the Trial Court. 11
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From the perspective of this model, the state is protected from the risk of costoverrun because the nature of the appropriation is as a fixed-price contract – that
is, cost-overruns are absorbed by the mediation centers and their network of
volunteers. For example, if mediation consumes significantly more time than
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normally expected, the community mediation centers do not submit an additional
charge to the court; indeed there is no chargeback system at all.
Are a reasonable number of mediations conducted in comparison to the size of the
contribution? Is this approach to acquiring services competitive with respect to
the market? Estimates by the Trial Court of the total number of mediations
indicate that the average “cost” per mediation is likely to be far below market
value. 12 Estimates by mediation centers of “in-kind” service provided by
volunteers indicate a breakeven point for state support of the center at roughly one
third of market value of the same service contracted on an hourly basis by the
court. For example, a prototypical center that receives $50,000 from the state,
which harnesses 1,000 volunteer hours, can be viewed as delivering mediation
services at $50/hr, whereas the market rate is around $150/hr. This very simplified
analysis suggests that if the state were to issue a request for proposals to outsource
mediation services the contract administrator would be hard-pressed to find
bidders.
It is notable, that in this “contract” model, there is no limit to the number of cases
referred by the court to the centers. In this case the state is protected from a much
larger potential cost-overrun should there be a larger number of cases referred
given the same state contribution to the centers. Is there evidence that the courts
and the state benefit from this control of the financial risk of cost-overrun in terms
of volume? There has been fairly consistent growth in the total number of
mediations provided while annual state allocation to the community mediation
centers has varied considerably. Secondly, prior to the currently more organized
state support, the community centers steadily delivered mediation services, in
many cases actually subsidizing the court through their own fundraising. Thirdly,
while their service load generally continues to increase, a number of centers do
not request any increase in funding.
The state could probably derive even more benefit in this regard. Over the past
few decades, through a variety of educational and training venues, the size of the
qualified volunteer base in Massachusetts has grown substantially. The Trial
Court estimates over 500 volunteers in the network of sponsored centers, with a
previous estimate of nearly 2000 across the state. There are indications that this
resource is underused, that is, from a resource perspective, there is overcapacity. 13
Secondly, indications in Massachusetts 14, 15 reflect the findings of studies in
many states that the utilization rate for mediation in cases for which it is
appropriate is often low, perhaps as low as 25%. 16 With respect to this simplified
model, viewing provision of mediation services as a fixed-price contract without
designating or limiting the expected number of mediations to be provided, the risk
of cost-overrun to the state is in underutilization. Utilization in cases appropriate
for mediation is primarily a function of the referral rate by the court.
Therefore, when viewed as a “contract” for services, the risk of “cost” overrun is
primarily under the control of the courts as a function of their referral rate. A
review of literature by Hedeen, regarding the nature of referrals, highlights
research by Mika that “the most powerful influence toward referring cases is a
word-of-mouth recommendation.” 17 Consistent congressional advocacy, court
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leadership, a properly orchestrated system of incentives, and measurement system
to improve utilization, supported by community centers working in partnership
with the courts to improve the dynamics of referrals are all measures to improve
utilization. 18 The danger is unintentionally increasing the rate of inappropriate
referrals.
Discussion
In summary, from the perspective of this simplified model of the state investment as
“contract” the evaluation of volume of mediations and average “cost” per case (as an
apportionment of state funding to the centers) demonstrates “contract” performance
advantageous to the state. Risk management of “cost” overruns, primarily under the
control of the courts, is also to the advantage of the state.
Counterpoint – On the other hand, suppose that the court dramatically increased its
utilization rate. Unless the growth in referrals was somehow indexed to state support of
community centers, their coordination resources would likely be overwhelmed. At that
point either more funding on a cost per case basis for the programs would have to be
provided or ADR services would have to be moved internally to be provided by court
personnel.
Counterpoint - As in most analogical thinking, the real insight comes from looking at
where the analogy falls short. In Massachusetts, state funding of community mediation
centers is not a “contract.” The funding primarily goes to supporting infrastructure, not
paying fees for services. The services provided are coordinated by the centers with the
delivery of the service made by uncompensated volunteers. The model is inappropriately
narrow in considering the benefits to the state based solely on comparative costs of
outsourcing with respect to the court rather than the broader, total cost/benefit picture.
The infrastructure supports many activities at the community level beyond handling
referrals from the court. The model also presumes mediation will be offered and thus
does not address comparative costs to the court of eliminating mediation. Another option
to consider is internalizing mediation services completely within the court versus
“outsourcing,” a question addressed in the next model.
In order to compare the value of investment in court-connected ADR, it would be
appropriate to consider where else in the state budget there is a contract with a private
service provider for an unspecified and to a large extent unlimited volume of service
requests, at a fixed price, in which the court and the state are protected from the risk of
cost overruns. Public agencies may operate under this type of public funding but are there
other such funding arrangements executed with private vendors? If so, these would be an
interesting basis for comparing the nature of the earmark to community centers viewed as
a contract.

Simplified Model 2: ADR Services Viewed as an Internal
Court Function
Introduction
Suppose internalizing mediation services within the courts were considered. There are
examples of states which provide a high percentage of mediation directly through the
courts. Perhaps the most extensive statewide system is Florida. The tracking of ADR in

MA Office of Dispute Resolution, Working Paper, January 2006. Version 6.doc

8

Illinois is representative of the breadth and diversity of ADR implementations across a
state. Such an arrangement may also enable additional innovation in earlier engagement
with previously reported success. 19
Model
The first point to highlight from the perspective of this simplified model is that
the state funding to the centers is primarily employed for infrastructure. If the
courts took on the task of providing mediation services within the courts
themselves, and available infrastructure already being paid for could be reused,
that is, the cost of additional infrastructure investment eliminated, could it save
the state money? Let us further suppose that the courts bypass the centers to
access their network of volunteers and that direct delivery of mediation services
remains uncompensated. Let us also suppose there are no additional transition
costs, but that the current court staff is already fully loaded. Would this provide
savings to the court and to the state?
An estimate of the additional court staff can be made from two perspectives. One,
the Massachusetts Housing Court does internalize ADR services to a large extent.
It requires a staff of 25 both to coordinate services and serve as neutrals. The
volume of non-housing ADR interventions is much larger. A second basis of
estimates is simply replacing the function of community center staff. Presume at
least one court staffer would be required to replace each currently funded
community center. The number of additional court staff would again at least be
greater than twenty. An increase in court budget, accommodating at least twenty
additional staff would be greater than the total budget request of the community
centers. Given the comparative volume of housing ADR interventions versus nonhousing, the number of additional staff required is probably much higher. Such
budgets are in place in California and are far larger, by any metric or ratio, than
that allocated by Massachusetts.
In the case that the state chose to redirect funds from the community mediation
centers directly to the courts they would lose the cost overrun protection brought
to light in the model above.
Discussion
In considering the justification for an operating budget, it is often useful to consider some
basis for comparison with respect to another course of action toward which the funds
could be allocated. Would the cost-benefit analysis of internalizing court-connected
mediation justify a budget allocation to the court? Such an analysis must of necessity
compare alternative venues of investment, in this case internalizing versus outsourcing.
While this is a natural mode of analysis in the financial community, and in industry, and
in many public policy systems, this type of thinking is not much in evidence within the
current budget process. Nor is there much of a comparative research base to support such
analysis.
A difference in this model, compared to states which internalize mediation would be in
the cost of transition of Massachusetts to such a system. There is almost no research
concerning transitions from one type of system to another.
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What is the likelihood of funding this approach to provision of mediation services?
Budget allocations to the courts in this area have been decreasing. Indeed, the Uniform
Rules, which call for a coordinator in each court – to interact with the community centers
and pro bono service providers (and not as ADR neutrals) goes largely unfulfilled in the
non-housing arenas.
Counterpoint – A good argument could be made for the potential of improved
efficiencies and increased utilization through the internalization of ADR services as has
been done within the Housing Court in Massachusetts. Unfortunately there is no solid
research base comparing in-court versus court-connected community mediation centers.
Therefore such a decision must of necessity address substantial risk in conversion of the
system. Should such a path be chosen, experimentation in selected courts, which are
leaders in integrated case management, would be the appropriate venue. The time
required for launch and evaluation of such pilots would probably require 3-5 years prior
to statewide roll out.

Simplified Model 3: ADR Services Viewed as a
Mechanism of Court Efficiency
Introduction
Another narrow view of a budget justification for supporting mediation of any kind is
viewing it as an investment in a process improvement program as a means of reducing
costs 20 to the court. It can be framed as follows.
Model
State funding of a particular community mediation center can reasonably be
expected to perform within the wide range of costs and benefits previously
evaluated and reported for the variety of mediation services in its portfolio. What
would be an appropriate basis of comparison for an investment with a similarly
low level of volatility in terms of investment performance? The preclusion of
cost-overrun, via a fixed-price unlimited services contract, can be interpreted as
an investment vehicle with low volatility and risk. A reasonable comparison
would be investment in a municipal bond or Treasury note. The hurdle rate
therefore would be returns on the order of less than 10%, probably around 4-6%.
While there are studies which conclude there is no discernable effect of mediation
services on costs, and even some studies which suggest that mediation is more
costly for certain types of cases, the majority of studies suggest cost savings
greater than that expected for investment in a bond or Treasury note, and some
present stellar returns.
If the median of the distribution of returns is even as low as in the range of 10%12% cost savings, an investment is on a par with returns expected of a well
diversified financial investment portfolio; better than many mutual funds. Yet it
likely enjoys a much lower volatility than the mutual fund market because it is a
fairly mature service delivery process, which expends resources in very small
increments. The evidence of cost studies that do report savings to the court
accruing from court-connected ADR, especially when part of an integrated court
management system, is generally higher than 20%.
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Discussion
There are a number of studies which report cost savings to the court at 10% and above. It
is interesting to note that in several interviews with people familiar with the research base
the opinion was expressed that 10% savings was not compelling. But as an investment
vehicle these returns are outstanding as compared to an alternative investment at similar
risk. A 10% cost savings to the court, for an investment in ADR, is twice the return on
investment, which ought to be expected for an investment vehicle with a low risk profile.
Counterpoint: The returns are probably not as great as the typical hurdle rate expected of
other process improvement investments such as for information technology. IT project
investments are typically heavily discounted to accommodate the likelihood of cost
overruns. Typical expected annual return on investment for IT is around 30%.
A shortfall of this analogy is that the investment in mediation has no cash-out mechanism
– that is the returns are not liquid. Furthermore, the cost savings, if accrued, and in order
to be realized, must be accompanied by a managerial objective for either reducing staff,
or redirecting resources. This is something difficult to do, although other states have
demonstrated such.
A conservative stance on the research base for court cost reduction is that in comparison
to many other metrics, this one is fairly immature. Most all the studies reviewed lack
financial sophistication. 21 Many of the court cost studies which provide good detail on
costs incurred for specific cases, do not include comparative control groups or
randomized sampling. There is widespread agreement that the evaluation of cost is
contingent on context, situation, case type, degree of integration with court management
systems, spatial location, amount of training of the referring coordinators, and so forth.
Some reviewers of the field conclude there is not strong evidence that there is any effect.
A small, but vocal set of researchers, who consider ADR “second rate” justice, attack the
extant research base on the effect of court costs. So too, cost studies are extremely
expensive to conduct. The cost of the oft-cited RAND report on the topic, 22 was four to
eight times the total annual Massachusetts state budget for court-connected ADR. The
critical response 23 to the RAND report suggests that a broad consensus was not reached
on the results. A major part of the controversy is whether it is appropriate to compare the
costs of court-connected ADR to that of trials at all since most cases are resolved without
going to trial with or without ADR. 24
An earlier work by Hensler at RAND presaged some of the difficulties in conducting the
RAND CJRA study. “What is the evidence that ADR programs actually achieve cost
savings for taxpayers…? The issue is not whether individual litigants can achieve cost
savings by using ADR in specific disputes – the answer to that question is almost
certainly yes. Rather, the question is whether courts or litigants can achieve aggregate
cost savings – reductions that show up on the bottom line – by substituting ADR for
litigation in large classes of disputes. The answer to this question is still largely
unknown.” 25
In the absence of sound data, compiled by the courts, an alternative indicator regarding
the bottom-line effect of ADR is suggested. The high rate of endorsement of ADR by
lead users, such as corporations, and the expanding use of ADR in corporate law, can
serve at least as proxy indicators in this regard. 26
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Is there a high risk of a downside for investing in court-connected ADR? “Could
investing in court-connected ADR actually significantly increase costs? There appears to
be no compelling evidence that aggregate costs to courts are increased across all
situations. Indeed, there are generally cost savings when the implementation of courtconnected ADR is accompanied by other changes in case management. There is however,
some suggestion in the available data that, because of the positive expectations of ADR,
an unintended consequence of implementing ADR may be to increase the filing of
claims. This may act to increase costs.
Another example of a suspected, unintended effect is the hypothesis is that as parties and
their lawyers become facile with the mediation process, some may tend to revise their
plans more often, entailing more revisits to the court. This is not a well substantiated
overall finding. Yet, it presents an interesting problem in the design of research which
seeks to ascertain actual costs. Bounding the scope of inquiry as the comparative cost of
the resolution associated with one filing misses the effect on costs throughout the lifecycle of the court’s involvement in addressing the underlying problem. Expanding the
scope of inquiry to include the effect of revisits on cost would be better. This too would
fall short of evaluating the trade-off of fairly minor costs for additional visits likely to be
of higher quality with the likely improvement in compliance and decreased, much higher
costs of enforcement. Measuring actual costs requires a systems dynamics perspective 27,
28
and a life-cycle orientation.
A decision not to fund community programs must necessarily address the potential risk of
increasing court costs – since the majority of studies do report improvement in this
regard. In addition, if not funded, there is an increased likelihood that some community
programs will fold. Following a decision not to fund these programs, the court assumes
the liability of transition costs to provide ADR by other routes, or will engender the exit
costs of eliminating ADR as a service.
In summary, Model 3 can be interpreted as follows:


Expected returns should probably be much lower than returns for riskier
investments in process improvement such as that for information technology.
Comparison with bonds seems reasonable.



The evidence base and reviewers of the evidence base are generally supportive of
a decision to invest in ADR presuming a) the emergence of new regime of
performance accountability as called for in the Monan Report; b) integration of
ADR referrals with court management systems; and c) monitoring of service and
outcome objectives applied throughout court services that enable the timely
steering of ADR implementation.



There is a high level of uncertainty in projecting cost savings to the court, due to:
a lack of data in the overall field as well as that specific to Massachusetts; no
commonly accepted standards for metrology (as there is in measures of
satisfaction); ongoing controversy regarding the scope of inquiry and the basis of
comparative analysis; insufficient economic and financial discipline in the ADR
research community; and the varied influence of contextual factors specific to the
courts being measured. In this regard, data cited which pertain to cost effects on
court operations ought to be considered unrefined or anecdotal.
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Projected cost savings to the court, resulting from an investment in ADR, as they
pertain to a diversion of court resources or a build-down in court staffing should
probably not be made until an integrated court management system and
evaluation baseline are in place. Until this transpires, it is unlikely that actual,
bottom-line savings will be realized. If gains are realized, it is unlikely the court
would know it and therefore the “savings” probably won’t be converted
efficiently.



It is instructive to compare the yes or no decision for Model 3 on the basis of risk
aversion to loss.
o If an investment in ADR is made is there a high expectation that this will
lead to an increase of cost to the court? No. Across the broad spectrum of
implementation the results are mixed. There is not a compelling evidence
base that demonstrates investments in ADR are consistently associated
with higher costs to the court. Indeed, the RAND report concluded there
was no significant effect on costs. 29
o If an investment in ADR is not made is there a high expectation that this
will lead to an increase of costs to the court? Presuming ADR referrals are
still made to the community programs a risk of concern is losing capacity.
If ADR services are offered in another manner, or if ADR is eliminated as
a service, then there will be transition costs. And of course, if there is a
significant cost savings to ADR, then it will not be realized. 30

On its own, this model illustrates the danger of adopting a narrow bound to return on
investment. Investment decision makers are increasingly concerned with total cost. The
question is what is the appropriate scope of concern? From the perspective of the state, it
would seem that consideration of total cost to the state and its citizenry, rather than
simply the operation of the court would be appropriate. We take up consideration of the
value provided litigants in the next model.

Simplified Model 4: ADR Services Viewed as a Quality
Improvement Measure
Introduction
Perhaps the most consistently reported benefit of providing mediation services in any
format is the significant improvement in party satisfaction. The term “significant” means
incontrovertible statistical correlation of benefit. 31 Many if not most of the studies
provide a comparative basis with respect to a proper control group, for example, of
disputes that were appropriate for mediation but took the litigation route. Many studies
include randomized studies that confer a high degree of confidence in the findings.
“Satisfaction”, in particular, “satisfaction with the process” 32 , is a widely employed
metric amongst the ADR research community. “Satisfaction” as a metric has been
cultivated over the past three decades, is fairly consistently applied, and backed up well
by quantitative statistical approaches. The predominant body of evidence is that parties to
a mediation are more satisfied with mediation as compared to litigation – regardless of
whether the outcome is in their favor or not. That is an amazing, prevalently reported
finding, which has enjoyed a broad consensus for over two decades and in a large variety
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of contexts. The decision to invest in ADR as a means of improving quality is supported
by a robust evidence base.
Historians of the ADR movement commonly cite the 1976 Pound Conference’s concern
with dissatisfaction as a launch point for ADR. 33 The development of measures of
satisfaction was directly linked to this purpose. In the following, a narrower consideration
of the effect of quality improvement on return on investment is considered.
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A summary of the number of studies in the annotated bibliography reporting mediation
satisfaction levels.

Model
A strategy to curtail growth in court budgets can productively focus on curtailing
preventable costs. Measures of satisfaction probably serve as a common indicator
that directly pertains to many preventable future costs. How so?
Adopting the model of mediation as ‘quality improvement’ evokes the simple
analogy of ‘satisfaction with process’ as ‘customer satisfaction with service.’ An
analogy 34 to the realm of manufacturing, where the Total Quality Management
(TQM) movement began, is to view “a mediation with satisfied parties” as a
‘defect free product’. In TQM, the adage, ‘right the first time’, captures the idea
that eliminating defects eliminates rework, which eliminates preventable costs.
The analogy to the ADR arena is resolving a dispute properly, that is getting it
‘right the first time’, implies fewer return visits to the court. TQM practitioners
demonstrated through countless cases that eliminating rework not only improved
quality, but saved costs as well. This was a mantra of the widely endorsed Quality
is Free program of Phil Crosby. 35 These approaches were translated into
government in the 1990’s, 36 as well as the legal profession, 37 and the courts 38, 39 ,
40 , 41 , 42 , 43 , 44
.
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What is the “rework”, that is, the preventable future costs in the courts? It comes
in many forms. The list includes for example, lack of compliance with
agreements, and other shortfalls that require more appearances before a judge. In
general, these are often failures to address underlying relational problems that
lead to reentry into the courts, or other state or community supported systems at a
later time.
Assume that ADR interventions generally focus on addressing the underlying
relationship between the parties. For cases appropriate for ADR, ADR tends to
address the underlying relationship better than litigation almost every time.
Evidence is good that parties to mediation are almost always more satisfied with
the process. They also gain some capacity for dealing with their underlying
difficulties – at the very least to know that they have an alternative to continuing
conflict and entering litigation. Further, presume a common sense linkage of
“satisfaction” as a strong indicator of eliminating revisits into the court and that
this presumption is supported by some solid data. The question is whether there is
a cost to this improved quality?
The majority of evidence in this regard is that litigants experience cost savings,
often large cost savings in comparison to similar cases that engage litigation –
often on the order of 30%. For example, a study of mediation in general civil
cases reported that half of the mediations reduced client cost an average of $6,000
with estimates for those which increased cost at an average of $1,000. 45 Larger
percentage savings are experienced in the larger cases. For example, an analysis
of 828 Civil Cases demonstrated an average cost of ADR of $870 for 19 hours of
work in contrast to average litigation costs of $10,700, for 89 hours of work. 46
Is there an increased cost of quality engendered by the courts? Based on the
discussion in Model 3 we cannot say for sure. However, there is definitely not a
strong compelling body of evidence that ADR taken as an overall portfolio, costs
significantly more than litigation. Furthermore, other reviewers in the field, who
conclude that there is no discernable effect on cost to the court, actually support
the notion that there is no cost of quality.
Discussion
Counterpoint - In the parlance of TQM, the first task is improving control of variance,
and then adjusting performance to a target objective. 47 A caveat here is that the court
administration must set directives and build up a number of managerial subsystems which
span human resource management, incentive structures, information systems with timely
performance feedback, data collection, evaluation, research, training programs, and esprit
de corps in order to exercise control on its performance. Where is the overall court
system in this regard? 48
Counterpoint - TQM has a high failure rate in the non-manufacturing domains. Failed
TQM programs go largely unpublished as this is not something people like to admit about
their own attempts, and it is not a popular situation to study in academia. So does this
make Model 4 inappropriate? As TQM was diffused into the non-manufacturing domains
of industry, the service sector, healthcare, NGOs, and government, it had to be reenvisioned and reinvented. Is anyone engaged in such a discourse regarding TQM in
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ADR? Yes. For example, NACFM has an ongoing program promoting TQM in
community mediation. 49
Counterpoint - There are unintended consequences of TQM. For example, if
improvements in productivity outpace increase in demand then there is overcapacity and
fewer workers are needed. Organizations must often support innovation to expand into
new domains in order to reuse the capacity they invested in. If they do not, they usually
end up cutting staff levels. Then workers associate TQM with headcount reduction and
the next wave of TQM is unsupported. Are there such unintended consequences resulting
from the growth of ADR and the seemingly high achievement of improved satisfaction
(quality)? There is such discourse. For example, a 2004 study in California included an
investigation as to whether the success of ADR encouraged early retirement of Judges
who went into private ADR practice. They found no supportive evidence for this
contention but kept open the concern. Another unanticipated dynamic may be that since
the number of attorney billable hours is significantly reduced, attorneys may be earning
less in using mediation, and consequently, they could become disinclined towards ADR.
The Collaborative Law movement stands in stark contrast to this concern, but it may be a
dynamic nevertheless. A third such unintended consequence, mentioned during
interviews, is that in areas where ADR is affecting a decrease in the workload of judges,
or even just perceived as such, there are judges who quietly decline to bring attention to
this effect. Note here the work of Galanter on “The Vanishing Trial.” 50 A fourth effect,
also mentioned during interviews, is that while judges’ time is likely to be freed up to
attend to cases which are not appropriate for ADR, they may be missing the cases that are
of intellectual interest to them. This at least creates uncertainty of the mixed effect of
ADR on their work. Yet another phenomenon derives from misperception -- another
interview included a scenario that some clerks believe that the court-connected mediation
services are directly funded by the court. In the face of unfilled vacancies among court
personnel and budgetary pressures on local courts, or even headcount reduction within
the court, this creates resentment towards ADR providers and the service.
Counterpoint – What about liquidity? Conversion of efficiencies engendered by the use
of ADR is more likely to be seen in productivity improvement or curtailing future growth
in personnel rather than bottom-line cost savings. 51
Counterpoint – What about the studies which indicate increased costs and decreased
quality? These studies, which are considered outliers by many, nonetheless warrant
serious consideration especially as they pertain to equal access to justice, the prospective
emergence of a two-tiered system of justice, ethnic and cultural bias, power imbalances,
inappropriately referred cases, and application of mediation in realms for which it is not
well suited. Instead of wishing them away because of their comparatively small number,
they probably ought to be the focus of the next wave of research – as that would seem to
be the source of discoveries, critical to the field. These may warrant serious inquiry.
While TQM has been implemented in the courts over the past decade, and there is
continued deployment specific to ADR, as promoted for example by NACFM, courts
have gone beyond TQM to adopt new managerial models such as strategic planning, data
mining, and futures studies. 52
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Simplified Model 5: ADR Services Viewed as means of
Reducing Lifespan of Case
Introduction
The data on cycle time reduction for ADR integrated with court management systems is
generally compelling, indicating the potential for substantial reductions in both the
calendar time and the lifespan of a case pending before the court. Some studies indicate,
for certain situations, that cycle time to conduct mediation can sometimes take longer.
This increase is shouldered largely by the ADR service and to a much less extent by the
court. So too, the widespread endorsement of the ADR approach by the business
community 53 often underlines their preferred use of ADR in the interests of reducing time
to resolution, to get back to business, and reduce unproductive time in courts. This is
especially of concern to small businesses. Reluctance to engage in ADR on the basis of
expected cycle time is associated with a lack of familiarity with the process, and a desire
for finality, which is based on their confidence in, and appeal to the authority of a judge.
Model
Many studies indicate cycle time reduction of months, some just a matter of days.
Very few studies indicate significant increases in time, and several suggest little
difference. While the raw research can seem confusing, reviewers of the field
generally agree that time savings are enjoyed when ADR is integrated with court
management systems. Of special note is the endorsement of this finding by
reviewers who question the overall value of ADR.
It is interesting to note that with respect to expectations regarding the duration of
a case, many businesses seek ADR for the same reason others avoid it and litigate.
That is, their belief in the certainty of a rapid resolution.
It is notable that some studies indicate that more money is transacted in ADR
handled cases versus litigation. It is also noteworthy that in civil cases, as the
amount in dispute increases, there tends to be a greater percentage cycle time
savings and increased percentage of cost savings to the litigants from ADR.
A Tabulation of Reported Effects on Disposition Time
(This table, drawn from the annotated bibliography, is roughly sorted from reports of
worse performance, to indiscernible effects, to strong support that ADR saves time.)
Bahr
Crime Justice

1987
1992

Hanson

1997

Clarke
Kakalik

1992
1996

Attorneys believed mediation increased time
Time to complete the process; the potential cases required an average
of 17 days to complete court processing with a range of 31 to 259 days. For
actual cases, the average length of time from referral to completion of
mediation was 18.6 days with a range of 1 to 50 days.
The median number of days to settlement for mediated cases was 146; for
non-mediated cases it was 109 (for settled cases only). For non-settled cases
mediation adds time to some cases that finish quickly, but has no overall
effect on the pace of settlement.
Disposition time increased in 2 of 3 counties, staying the same in the 3rd.
There was no difference in time to disposition between mediation and nonmediation groups in PA, OK, and NY, and significantly slower in mediation
in TX
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Keilitz

1988-90

Stienstra

Kobbervig
Eavenson

1991
1998

Georgia Dis Res

2000

Nasworthy

2000

Stienstra

1994

Wissler

1997

Wissler

1999

Donnelly

2000

Gomez

1998

Keilitz

1992

Bridenback

1979

Cook

1980

Emery
Hartwell
Schultz

1982-87
1988
1990

Goerdt

1992

Schildt

1994

Macfarlane

1995

McAdoo

1997

Regarding case processing time, the evaluators found the pace of litigation
was faster for mediated cases in some courts and slower for mediated cases
in others. The evaluators point out that many things affect case processing
time which are unrelated to the mediation program.
46% of the attorneys involved in the program reported that it decreased
disposition time. Forty-one percent felt the program had no effect on
disposition time.
No difference in time to disposition was found
No significant change in time to disposition in Gwinnett County, a 57 day
drop in disposition time in Cobb County during first 6 months of program.
Long-term effect not significant (0.6 month drop in second 6 months).
Participants did not feel that they spent less time litigating their case if they
went to mediation
Lawyers believed they worked the same amount of time as for a trial, but
other interviewees said mediation would save courts money (attorneys are
paid by the court).
61% of the attorneys reported that ADR reduced the time to disposition.
Only 24 attorneys reported that ADR added to the disposition time of their
case.
Parties thought they were saving time; attorneys thought processing time was
greater.
There was little sense by parties that mediation reduced time involvement
(23%). Attorneys thought it reduced time (about 66%)
No difference found between mediated and non-med cases. 76% Attorneys
found meditation reduced time spent on case
The programs did not appear to affect the time to disposition or the number
of pre-trial hearings or motions. They did appear to reduce the number of
pre-trial conferences
Mediation did not reduce the number of hearings held. Time to disposition
was faster for mediated cases in 3 of 4 courts.
The average time from case referral to disposition was 11 days; the median
time was 8 days. For three of the neighborhood justice centers studied, the
time from a referral to a mediation hearing was 10 days. The time to
disposition without a mediation hearing was 11 days. For cases that failed to
achieve a resolution, the time was 14 days. Case processing in traditional
court took longer.
Time to disposition was significantly lower for cases that were mediated
than for those that were not.
Evaluators found settlements are reached more quickly in mediation
Attorneys believed that mediation saved their and their clients' time
Processing time decreased (but looked at mediation cases from time of
referral, not from filing).
The author estimated that each case settled saved 30-45 minutes of judge
time
Participants who settled their cases in mediation overwhelmingly believed
mediation was a quicker alternative to litigation
Lawyers and parties thought processing time was shorter for mediated cases,
a perception that was affirmed through court records.
46.7% said it saved attorney time
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Hann

2001

For each case type, a higher percentage of Rule 24.1 cases were disposed of
within 6 months than for cases in the control group (in which cases were
managed but only a few were mediated). Time to disposition appeared to be
quicker after Rule 24.1.

Wissler

2002

Early referral led to shorter time to disposition – for both cases that settled
and those that did not. Parties were more likely to believe time and money
were saved if the case settled in mediation.

Eaglin

1990

Clarke
Emery

1995
1989

Fairbanks

2001

Hanson

1991

Unsettled mediated cases took an average of 12 days longer to move from
docketing to submission than non-mediated cases, but taken as a group all
cases assigned to mediation took an average of 25 fewer days from filing to
disposition
Processing time decreased 7 weeks w/ mediation
Time to settlement was three weeks in mediation and seven weeks in
adversarial settlement.
The median number of days in James City County in disposition time for
mediated cases was 48 days; in York County the median was 92 days.
Case processing time, the mediated cases were faster with a 110 day median
versus 178 days for the control group. In addition, the appeals of settlements
were not much longer than appeals of non-conference settlements. For the
75th percentile, the medians were 187 days (mediated) versus 178 days
(control).

Zuberbuhler

1999

No significant difference was found in time to disposition; mediated cases on
average were disposed of 2 months faster than those undergoing custody
evaluations (which included 5.3% of the control group).

Judicial
Council of CA

1996

Lowe

1992

The pace of litigation, the average time from filing to mediation was 343
days. In San Diego, the time was 257 days; in Los Angeles, the average time
was 385 days. The researchers also found that the number of days from filing
to mediation was longer for successful mediation (298 days) than for failed
mediation (262 days).
The program improved the pace of litigation. The median time for the
experimental group was 314 days while the median time for the control
group was 346 days, from filing to disposition.

Slack

1996

Prior to the mediation program, time to disposition ranged from 37 to 1434
days, with a mean of 367.47. After the mediation program commenced, time
to disposition ranged from 44 to 974 days, with a mean of 338.73.

Hanson

2000

Prior to the introduction of mediation the average number of days to the
grant or denial of appeal was 448, with another 202 days to opinion.
Mediation took 60 days to move from the filing of the petition for review to
mediation (some took up to 120 days).

Mandell

2002

McEwan

1991

Time to resolution, 13% of cases in the treatment were resolved within 3
months (the deadline for mediation), as compared to 9% of cases in the
control group. Approximately 25% of cases in the treatment group were
resolved within 4 months (the deadline for discovery), as opposed to 12% of
control group cases. All other date-delimited percentages were the same.
Thus, the main impact of mediation on time to disposition came within the
first months of the life of the case.
Successfully mediated cases had shorter disposition time compared with the
control group; however, for cases that did not settle, the disposition time was
longer. The average time to disposition for the experimental group as a
whole was about 60 days shorter than for the control group.
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Pearson

1991

The evaluators found that successfully mediated cases had time savings.
Cases that mediated successfully took 8.5 months. Cases that litigated took
10.5 months. Cases that mediated unsuccessfully and therefore needed both
mediation and litigation took 14.2 months.

Pearson

1984

Time from the initiation of the proceeding to the final order in successfully
mediated cases was 9.7 months on average, 11.9 months on average for the
control group, 11.1 months for those who were referred but rejected
mediation, and 13.4 months for cases that were unsuccessfully mediated.

Snapp

1997

Strong statistical and practical support for proposition that ADR saves time.
ADR brought case terminations at 28% faster rate than traditional litigation often without the need for discovery.

Discussion
What is the value of reduced cycle time to the court? This is likely to be specific to the
court system in question and the objectives of court administration, scheduling, and the
case management system need.
Is there a cost to cycle time and calendar time reduction? Most studies in the ADR
research base suggest a correlation with cost savings. In industry, it is widely believed
that improving quality tends to decrease cost and decreasing cycle time reduction tends to
improve quality as well as reduce cost.
Counterpoint: Some studies suggest that ADR is viewed by some as a mechanism for the
court to dispose of cases faster, which they see as inappropriate. As for example in family
matters where speed is not always in the interest of the children, the parents, or the need
of the court for detailed investigation. There are also reports that some parties to an ADR
process feel unduly pressured to settle more quickly than the parties anticipate. Similarly,
settlement rates, which have become a de facto standard of the success of ADR, is
viewed by many as placing the goal of case processing efficiency above the interests of
the parties. These all warrant consideration. They further support the notion that more
than one metric or narrow model needs to be considered.
To the extent that the budget decision-maker believes that ADR will be well integrated in
the emerging court management systems and that an objective for court performance is
improved disposition time, the evidence supports an affirmative decision. There is not a
substantial evidence base which demonstrates a high risk of not achieving improvement
in disposition time when ADR is integrated with court management. However, the variety
in the reported data, lack of recent Massachusetts data, and early stage of the new court
management regime implies a high degree of uncertainty in projecting actual potential
time savings. So, in the context of a directive to integrate ADR with the court
management systems there is a low downside risk of failure, but a very high degree of
uncertainty regarding the level of upside success.
What about studies regarding unintended consequences with respect to disposition? One
RAND study in the handling of automotive cases in New Jersey presents a cautionary
note. 54 But note that this was in the realm of arbitration outside the typical practice of
community mediation centers.
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Simplified Model 6: ADR Services Viewed as a Risk
Management Vehicle
Introduction
Investment in community ADR could be viewed as an approach to risk management. The
basic idea is that ADR interventions preclude bigger problems later. More specifically,
investment ADR interventions are paid back by avoiding the large cost of a
comparatively small number of events at a later time. Previous models constrained the
scope of inquiry to the court and metrics that pertained primarily to performance of the
court. In this model the scope of interest is the total cost to the state across all services,
and for longer time horizons than disposition time of particular cases.
Model
Consider the following examples.


Juvenile / Neighborhood Criminal Cases: Interventions including mediation
with a juvenile criminal, who is causing trouble in a neighborhood, can be
viewed as a mechanism of risk management with respect to the correctional
system. Suppose that of the several dozen such cases engaged by a
community center over a two year period that one is ascertained to have kept
the juvenile out of the juvenile detention system. The estimated savings solely
from avoiding the cost of detention for one year is $30,000+.



Permanency Mediation Cases – similarly, consider the cost savings to
avoiding a contested court case involving foster care. In Massachusetts an
estimated savings from precluding this type of event is conservatively
estimated at $6,000. Let us suppose three such events are prevented by said
center every two years.
Average Cost per mediation
Projected Cost of Court Case (1 week)

$3,000
$8,860

Court Case Reimbursement rates
$1,772/day
Judge
$421
Clerk Magistrate
$331
Session Clerk
$143
Court Officer
$174
Probation Officer
$189
DSS Social Worker $138
DSS Attorney
$179
CPCS Attorney
$195
Plus costs for stenographers and expert witnesses,
Plus continued foster care placement during litigation.
This is a conservative underestimate as cases often run longer. 55


Permanency Mediation Cases – suppose that one success is achieved by said
center every two years that avoids a single year of foster care placement –
saving $20,000+ per annum.
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Note that the average Massachusetts state funding per funded center is $40K per
year. The above set of precluded events would pay back the entire contribution of
the state to that center.
Discussion
Consider yet another type of event, reviewed in a Ph.D. dissertation at John Hopkins. In a
program in Maryland, after several calls to police for domestic violence at the same
address, the police make a referral to mediation themselves with documented savings. 56,
57 , 58

Risk management approaches have evolved in domains of practice concerned with safety.
A risk management framework may be applicable in the role of mediation in violence
prevention as it pertains to safety. This is an emerging perspective of public health
research in addressing violence. An example of the transference of risk management
approaches between domains is seen in the adoption of methods of the National
Transportation Safety Board in the Patient Safety arena. The use of mediation as a
mechanism of risk management can be seen as part of a broad shift in risk management
services provided to families. 59

Simplified Model 7: ADR Services Viewed as Leveraged
Funding Portfolios
Introduction
Perhaps the most compelling, solid, indisputable, current data, specific to Massachusetts,
is the diversified portfolios of funding assembled by the community mediation centers.
Several examples from the past year illustrate the portion of the state contribution to these
centers.
Model
As a benchmark, note that the current average funding per center of $40K is less
than 75% of the average operating budgets of community mediation centers
nationwide. 60 Massachusetts reflects the nation in the leveraging effect – the other
75% of the funds is raised by the community mediation centers themselves.
Consider the following example centers for FY05 funding:
Center 1
State contribution was 25% of total program funding
Center 2
State contribution was 23%% of total program funding
Center 3
State contribution was 12.5% of total program funding
Center 4
State contribution was 15% of total program funding
Center 5
State contribution was 8% of total program funding.
How has the state contribution and overall portfolios changed over time?
Center 1 grew their funding over 110% over the past decade with the state
contribution floating between 25-30% of total funding.
Center 2 grew their funding portfolio by 50% over the last five years – with only a
minor increase in state support.
Center 3 has grown their portfolio almost tenfold over the past fourteen years with
the state’s contribution declining as a percentage of total revenue.
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Center 4’s revenue has declined about 10% over the last several years reflecting a
sudden 25% decline in the state’s contribution followed by fairly steady funding
at the lower level.
Center 5 grew revenue by 12% over the past five years while the state
contribution declined 28%.
Many believe that the state investment in a community mediation center is an
important signal for other funders such as foundations, and corporations. It is
taken as a mark of legitimacy, which is stronger than certification. Furthermore,
many foundations will not fund infrastructure as the earmark does.
A strong argument can be made that the state, by providing at least some funding,
leverages its investment.
Discussion
The state’s contribution is leveraged several-fold by additional contributions assembled
by the community centers in the service of the public. It is believed by several
interviewees, and some literature, that by sending a signal of legitimacy and value, the
state is in part responsible for assisting the community centers in this additional fundraising. From this perspective, for the sample of community centers above, the state
contribution leverages 300% to 1250% of additional funding.
It may also be appropriate in the portfolio model to include the donation of ‘in-kind
services.’ In Model 1, the role of volunteer mediation was viewed “as if” it were a
contracted service. Pro bono mediation provided by volunteers is more appropriately
considered from the standpoint of leveraged resources. The state investment in
infrastructure can be viewed as leveraging the contribution of volunteer resources. For
example, the state contributed roughly $180K to Center 5 from 2000-2005. During that
period, Center 5 handled over 10,000 ADR transactions.








Community & Court mediation referral
Community & Court mediations
School mediation referrals
School mediations
Participants in facilitations
Participants in communication skill and mediation trainings
Participants in school trainings

2,347
1,279
1,393
602
1,546
1,029
1,305 youths
832 adults

While the work of community centers in school mediation is partially funded by the
Department of Justice, the infrastructure funded by the earmark also serves volunteers in
the school setting. This spill-over effect is viewed as critical by community center
directors.
Across the state there are perhaps over 2,000 trained mediators, with roughly 500
attached to the community centers receiving state funding via earmark. Massachusetts
centers reflect national volunteer resources in the leveraged portfolio such centers.
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The distribution of volunteers per center based on a national sample compiled by NAFCM. 61

By its inconsistency in annual budget allocation, the state is sending a mixed signal to the
other funders who support the centers’ service to the state. When, by lack of
infrastructure funding, a center becomes insolvent, the state in essence either loses the
relational infrastructure of the volunteer resources or transfers the burden of transition to
the volunteers themselves.

Simplified Model 8: ADR Services Viewed as
Investments in Social Capital
Introduction
This model views the partnership of court and community mediation centers as a network
for building healthy safe communities in furtherance of statewide initiatives such as
Massachusetts Partnership for Healthy Communities (MPHC). The purpose of MPHC
overlaps and intersects with activities of the community mediation programs. At the
community level, community mediation centers prevent family violence, integrate
community policing with neighborhood leadership, organize resources with mental health
services, coordinate elderly services, prevent homelessness, and repair business
relationships.
Model:
The community mediation programs can frame their supportive purpose as:
Practitioners of Alternative Dispute Resolution deliver mediation services which
strengthen communities throughout Massachusetts. Community Mediation helps
build healthy communities by its focus on strengthening the relationships that
make up a community - within the family, between neighbors, between businesses
and their customers, and between agencies and the citizens they serve. By
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declaring the intent to partner with the Massachusetts Partnership for Healthy
Communities community mediation centers acknowledge their longstanding
involvement towards the intent of the MPHC initiative and declare their joint
intent in leveraging community mediation activities, especially in support of
community action programs. 62 Community Mediation Programs are at the heart
of building strong vibrant communities. Mediators engage communities through a
spectrum of interventions:
- In schools
o Delivering peer mediation training for preventing youth violence
o Ensuring alignment of services with children’s needs
o Assisting children with life transitions
- With the Family
o Preventing violence, and protecting the interests of children, the
parties, and the neighborhood during difficult transitions such as
divorce, placement of children, and providing restorative justice after
family violence.
o Facilitating positive outcomes in the joint interests of family,
neighborhoods, and victims involved with juvenile behavior.
- In the neighborhood
o Ensuring equitable situations regarding housing and the prevention of
homelessness.
o Resolving conflicts over property rights and gaining agreements on
land use issues.
- In business
o Supporting productive local markets through resolution of
disagreements in business transactions.
- For education and academia
o Providing training opportunities through internships for students of
mediation programs and law schools.
o Directly training and delivering continuing education for volunteer
mediators in the community, building community capacity, and
steadily transforming the culture.
Therefore, state contribution to community mediation centers could be viewed as
investments in social capital and expanding the Commonwealth’s investment in
the Massachusetts Partnership for Healthy Communities. State funding could be
appropriated for community mediation centers through the MPHC initiative as
well as through the Trial Court.
The emergence of court and community collaboration also serves as models of
social capital building. For example, the Worcester Housing Court makes referrals
to homeless prevention programs to assist tenants at risk of eviction. Similarly,
the District and Probate Courts make referrals to community mediation programs.
Beyond resolving a dispute, the mediation process often connects parties to a
network of support services. Community mediation centers are a locus of
interagency coordination. Partnerships of the court with community programs and
working through the community programs are methods for community-building.
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Court and community collaboration is in evidence across the country in the
community justice movement 63 , community/neighborhood courts, problemsolving courts, restorative justice, preventative justice, therapeutic jurisprudence.
The community justice movement is seen by its practitioners as a mechanism of
public safety. 64
Discussion:
The growth in use of ADR and mediation, as part of an extended service of the court, can
be seen as part of a long cycle in the balance of the justice system with systems of
equity. 65, 66 The fulcrum of this pendulum is in the connection between state and
municipal legal systems with social systems embedded in the community, especially
community mediation centers. Early in the twentieth century, Mary Parker Follet 67 , a
scholarly practitioner in community development and mediation in the Boston area,
characterized this dynamic as “a kind of balance theory” concerning individuality versus
society’s interests. 68 She considered the “balance theory” which seemed to underlie
partisan politics at the state level a “monstrous fallacy” since these forces must be
brought into synchrony at the neighborhood level. The Neighborhood Justice Centers
project government justice reform program, of the mid-1970s, sought to restore
neighborhoods as the locus of the system of equity. A review by the Department of
Justice suggests the role of the courts in this regard resulted from the waning influence of
the traditional social institutions of family, church, and informal community leadership. 69
Aligning the purpose of the state budget on court-connected community mediation
programs with an overarching strategy for community-building makes a lot of sense.
Community mediation programs can easily engage as partners in these types of initiatives
throughout the Commonwealth. To the extent that some are already engaged in this
partnership, why not raise the visibility of their involvement? Is there a broader statewide
initiative which matches so many service areas already engaged by the community
mediation programs? Is there greater momentum behind any statewide program that
could be leveraged in so many areas as that for Healthy Communities? By engaging this
as a strategic directive, community mediation centers frame the value for which they
provide such unique and critical competencies: in building social capital by focusing on
strengthening communities – one relationship at a time.

Summary and Analysis of Models for Evaluating ADR
Return on Investment
The first four models outlined above address cost. As over-simplifications:
• Model 1 addresses cost control via the model of a contract;
• Model 2 considers the classic ‘internalize versus outsource’ decision;
• Model 3 addresses ADR as a cost reduction strategy.
• Model 4 asks “Is there a cost of quality in ADR?” Quality drives cost reduction.
The analysis in Model 1 surfaced the mechanism of controlling the risk of cost overrun
for services built into the current funding and service delivery arrangement. It concludes
there is an arrangement favorable to the state. The risk is underutilization which is
primarily under the control and influence of the courts.
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Model 2 drew out the need to evaluate funding in comparison to some alternative. That
comparison considered the extreme cases of not funding external services at all – either
by internalizing it or returning completely to litigation. Model 2 indicates the feasibility
of internalizing ADR services but illustrates that it would require a major upheaval in the
approach to budgeting of both the courts and the community centers. Such a
consideration ought to consider the total system.
Model 3 suggests that people involved in this budget decision-making process ought to
adjust the “hurdle” rate expected of the investment to be in line with other low risk
investments.
Model 4 acknowledged that ADR improves the quality of court services. This is well
documented and enjoys a very broad consensus. It also notes that since there is no
compelling body of evidence that ADR costs more than litigation, there is no ‘cost of
quality’. Model 4 draws on the good evidence base regarding “satisfaction with process”
as another, powerful means of demonstrating the low risk of investment in ADR. It also
points out how the improvement of quality can be seen as a driver of cost reduction.
Model 4 makes the bridge to consideration of process life cycle, closely associated with
the concern of cycle time reduction in Model 5.
In considering a budget allocation as an investment, it is appropriate to consider other
investment options which have comparable risk profiles with a solid data record
regarding its volatility and return on investment over time – that is, the financial markets.
Interestingly enough, this is not very complicated at a first level of analysis. A proxy
approach is to consider simply the distribution of the number of studies that report returns
on ADR investment at various levels. Look at the variation of the data on ADR and
match it to a general class of financial instrument. After review of a large number of such
studies, ADR would seem to appeal to a risk adverse investor. This implies that a
reasonable “hurdle” rate to expect, as a return on investment in ADR, ought to be in line
with the comparable returns from a class of financial instruments with a similar risk
profile. That is just 4-6%.
Why then would anyone consider a 10%-20% cost savings to not be an attractive return
on investment. A 10%-20% cost savings is two to five times the expected rate of return
for an alternative investment with similar risk. Perhaps, as was suggested by a participant
in the workshop, “because they just never thought about it that way.” Whatever the
reason, this point warrants consideration, particularly by budget analysts.
Model 3 points out that while the research on the impact of ADR on court costs can seem
complicated, confusing, and inconclusive, one can derive valuable insight regarding the
overall distribution of reported cost impacts and interpret that as volatility. While there is
great variation, the distribution is not unusual at all. Cost studies within organizations for
their portfolio of projects of a common type typically indicate a “bunching” of costs
savings near the low end. There are typically a small percentage of projects that have
negative returns. There are also typically a set of projects which enjoy cost savings. The
number of projects which perform in a stellar fashion are comparatively low in number. 70
ADR seems less volatile than financial markets that can go into a downswing. There is no
comparable evidence of the “downswing” phenomenon in the ADR field that would
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cause widespread devaluation of the ADR investment. The beauty of the ADR
investment is that the returns are comparatively incremental and steady. The returns may
sometimes not play out on a case-by-case basis, or in certain situations, or in court
administrations that do not integrate ADR with case management systems and
scheduling. Yet, the majority of studies indicate positive returns on investment in terms
of cost savings. There is good consensus in the research community on positive returns
when ADR is deployed in conjunction with strong court administration, integrated with
case management systems.
Still, there is no solid consensus in the research community that, in the absence of
integrated case management, ADR will still provide cost savings to a court. Bibliometrics
on the topic indicate that it is an active area of debate. Would it then be useful for the
purpose of budget justification to try to discern the data on impact on court costs?
Probably not. Researchers, at the RAND Corporation, supported by economists,
statisticians, analysts, and a budget several-fold larger than the Massachusetts annual
state budget for community mediation centers, pursued this question and the results were
considered inconclusive by reviewers. Trying to draw a different conclusion ourselves
would likely be similarly inconclusive and, in the worst case, lead to “paralysis by
analysis.”
The more important finding is that most all the studies focus on a few metrics with which
to assess judicial and court staff time to measure cost savings. Few studies address the
effect of ADR on costs to other state and municipal agencies that are often involved in
cases appropriate for ADR. No study considers the use of ADR in the courts with respect
to all the cost reductions to business relationships (and hence taxes), police, social
services, the penal system, healthcare, mental health services, and the schools. One must
ask of course, where is it appropriate to draw the boundaries of analysis with respect to
organizations and time?
Models 5, 6, 7 and 8 illustrate broader consideration of the return on investment than is
typically captured within the narrow scope of inquiry of most research studies.


Model 5 Cycle Time, through tabulation of summary findings on disposition time,
illustrates the variety of answers provided by research given different definitions
of what is being measured.



Model 6 presents the actuarial stance, apropos to risk management. The strength
of the presentation is that comparatively few downstream events are required to
payback investment in ADR. The weakness is that there are few longitudinal
studies which provide an evidence base.



Model 7 (Leveraging) points out that the state is already engaged in a publicprivate partnership enabled by the diversified funding portfolios of the community
centers. In contrast to most of the research studies cited in the report, this data is
based on hard numbers, specific to the programs, and are current with good trend
data. This does not require any significant additional research.



Model 8 presents the investment in ADR as an investment which complements
the state’s strategic agenda for strengthening communities.
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Recommendations on Investment Based on Different Models
and with Respect to Different Policy Objectives
Model 1 Outsourcing
Model 2 Internalize vs.
Outsource

Yes
3

3
*

Model 3 Court Costs

Model 4 Quality

Model 5 Cycle Time

No

3
*
**
3
*

3
**

Model 6 Risk Management

3
**

Model 7 Leveraging

3
*
**

3
*

Model 8 Social Capital

3
**

3
*

Comment
A contract with no downside risk
Don’t know, there are great examples but
internalizing would require a switch to
long range budget planning
A risk adverse investor would say there is
too much uncertainty, even though there
might not be much actual financial risk.
Strongest, most consistent data on
satisfaction supports an affirmative vote
on this measure under any policy.
Evidence base is generally supportive but
it is not clear a focus on cycle time is in
the interest of society.
Its believable, makes common sense, this
is where the really compelling stories are
from. But this type of analysis requires
longitudinal studies over a lifetime. A yes
vote seems to just make sense, but it
would only be supported anecdotally
rather than by a strong evidence base.
This is hard data, current, and most
specific to the programs. But this thinking
about the good of the whole community
may be too broad if a decision maker is
focused on court efficiency alone.
Excellent endeavor that can be launched
regardless of the funding decision.

Under a Policy Objective Focused on Court Efficiency
* Given the softness of the data, if the policy objective were to focus primarily on
improving court efficiency, and the state had a choice of investment vehicles towards that
end, then investing the money in the strategic level actions recommended in the Monan
Report would be a priority. This would include such things as an integrated case
management system, reorganization, data collection, training for court personnel. Even if
court-connected ADR has a stellar effect on the court efficiency, one would never be able
to confirm it because the court systems are unable to track its performance. Investment
based on the models taken individually is recommended based on Models 1, 4, and 7.
Investment advice from Models 2, 3, and 5 are not supported by a strong evidence base
with respect to implementing an efficiency policy. Model 3 is however, an implicit
presumption in implementing ADR. It is not clear that Models 6 and 8 are directly
supportive of an efficiency policy.
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Under a Policy Objective Focused on Service to the Community
** If on the other hand the policy objective were to provide benefit for the state,
especially local communities, then these models suggest investment advice would be to
fund it. Models 7 and 8 are the most compelling in this regard. Model 7 has hard data
and Model 8 great stories but no firm evidence base. Model 4 seems to be a strong
supporter of this directive as well. It is not clear that Model 5 supports overall societal
goals – this is a current topic of debate. It is not clear if Model’s 1, 2, or 3 are directly
supportive of an directive for overall benefit to the state.
A range of similar policy objectives needs to be developed and one policy objective
selected. Then the financial models for ADR can be evaluated within a performance
context along the lines above.

Budget Justification
with Respect to Policy Directive
Policy Directive
Model
Supports Funding Decision
Strong Evidence-Base
Don’t know if model
supports directive
•
•
•
•

Court
Performance
1, 4, 5, 7
1, 4, 7
6, 8

Model 1 Cost control via contract
Model 2 Internalize
Model 3 Cost reduction strategy
Model 4 Cost of quality

•
•
•
•

Overall Benefit
to State
4, 6, 7, 8
4, 7
1, 2, 3

Model 5 Reducing case lifespan
Model 6 Risk Management
Model 7 Leverage portfolios
Model 8 Building Social Capital.

Conclusion
The primary value often derived from the above type of analysis is the surfacing of
assumptions and identification of the need for clarity in direction setting. The use of
multiple models is a means of generating a variety of perspectives towards that end. Care
has been taken to illustrate where these models, taken as analogies, fit as well as fall
short. The sensitivity of a yes/no decision based on particular models is to some extent
illustrated with respect to the stance and belief of the decision maker and the
administrative objectives of the court system.
Several places in the narrative point out where performance objectives for the court
system pertain to both the value of the model as well as whether one could draw a
conclusion on a model. Performance and accountability in government suggest setting
objectives and measuring results as a means of ensuring transparency in public funding.
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The objectives serve the guiding and monitoring of implementation and the integration
with court management systems. The “ostensible” case management and quality
objectives for implementing ADR, identified by the Standing Committee in the 1998
report, 71 should probably be revisited with respect to priority setting. 72
The Trial Court’s pamphlet “A Guide to Court-Connected Alternative Dispute Resolution
Services” identifies the top four advantages of ADR 73 as saving time and money, finality,
compliance, and custom-made solutions. This appeal is no doubt based on the Homo
economicus model of the rational, fully informed, economically self-interested person
driven by extrinsic motivations. Yet, the advantage included in the guide, which is most
directly pertinent to the building of social capital, appealing to the combined interest of
the individual, the community they live in, the court, and the state which serves them is
Preservation or Enhancement of Long-Term Relationships. 74 Critical to the integrity,
development, and resilience of families and their neighborhoods this objective is also
especially pertinent to small claims involving businesses. Businesses well understand the
adage that “it costs an order of magnitude more to get a new customer as to preserve a
relationship with an existing customer.” The current Trial Court Standing Committee on
Dispute Resolution should reflect on whether the belief system which underlies how they
prioritize proposed benefits of ADR might be better served by combining this baseline
with a Homo sociologicus 75, 76 model, which accounts for the strong social influence on
what parties to a dispute really want. That is their voice to be heard, someone to listen to
their story - to address their and society’s interest in the fulfillment of social roles. The
nature of such frame reflection is critical to policy setting in order to balance the Logic of
Consequence with a Logic of Appropriateness.
A combined framework would also better accommodate the dual need of community
centers to appeal to the combined interest of prospective users of the ADR process, as
well as better represent the intrinsic motivation and reflective craftsmanship of volunteer
ADR practitioners – the greatest asset in the system of equity which balances the formal
system of jurisprudence.

MA Office of Dispute Resolution, Working Paper, January 2006. Version 6.doc

31

Suggestions for Future Work
The following suggestions are offered to continue the work initiated in this Working
Paper. MODR is interested in collaborating on the execution of these projects. Individual
project proposals can be developed and funding sources identified to complement the
annual appropriation.
1. Setting Policy
1.1. Clarify policy objectives and priorities in the context of the Uniform Rules on
Dispute Resolution. Foster alignment of the Legislature, the CJAM, and the
Standing Committee on common policy directives.
1.2. Integrate ADR policy directives with the court management systems, data
collection and evaluation.
2. Implementing Court-Connected ADR
2.1. Map the current geographic coverage of all court-connected mediation in the
state.
2.2. Launch a strategic planning process for the development of an Implementation
Plan for Court Connected ADR System, integrated with court ADR policy.
2.3. Conduct a needs assessment for the court and the legislature of the courtconnected programs to inform decision making in the FYO8 Budget Cycle.
2.4. Develop a new Report to the Legislature on the Impact of ADR on the Court.
2.5. Construct a projective cost-benefit analysis of ADR in the Courts.
2.6. Install a data collection and evaluation system, drawing on existing ADR data
collection standards 77 , 78 to generate Massachusetts ADR performance data on an
ongoing basis. This ought to be conducted in conjunction with related
administrative activities launched in response to the Monan Report.
2.7. Conduct “Future of Court-Connected ADR” event.
3. Connecting Court and Community ADR to Broader Public Initiatives
3.1. Forge a strong collaboration between mediation centers and the Massachusetts
Partnership for Healthy Communities initiative.
3.2. Select and implement innovative proven models from other states to advance
court-community collaboration in new areas.
3.3. Form a state association – Practitioner-Research network.
4. Connecting Court and Community ADR to MODR’s Overall Research Agenda
4.1. Commission the Trial Court Libraries to compile a special collection on ADR
research starting with those reports in the annotated bibliography.
4.2. Launch research network considering the role of ADR in Social Capital
formation and community building.
4.3. Engage the Campbell Collaboration of the American Institutes of Research in
Systematic Research Synthesis of lifespan effects of mediation.
4.4. Design and deploy a forecasting system for conflict prevention in communities
leveraged by Geographic Information Systems for the purpose of supporting
data-driven planning of future budgets.
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…it is indisputable that ADR has been ‘sold’ within the court context as a set of procedures for
reducing judicial caseloads and cutting time to disposition. ADR proponents have therefore been
disappointed by research suggesting that cost and time savings may be illusory.
This is not because resolving a dispute short of adjudication is as costly as taking a case to trial. If
parties can reach resolution through ADR, the public and private costs of litigation will almost
certainly be less than the costs of full-blown trial. But in the court setting, ADR does not substitute
for trial, but rather adds one or more procedures for facilitating settlement to the lawyer-driven
negotiation process.
The question is: Under what circumstances does ADR reduce cost and time to disposition, by
comparison with old-fashioned negotiation? My reading of the available data suggests that when
savings occur, it is because they are accompanied by other changes in case management, for
example, imposing strict time guidelines where such did not exist (or, were not consistently
implemented) previously, or limited discovery.
Hensler concludes this section with the suggestion that “large institutional ‘repeat players’ are in a better
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‘repeat players’ generally endorse the use of ADR? Surveys suggest this is a resounding ‘yes’, and studies
indicate further expansion of its use. (Note as the contrary position is not a popular one it may be underreported.)
“Why is there a perception that ADR saves time and money?” “Why does there seem to be a discrepancy
between the perception and objective data?” Hensler suggests:
One possibility is that we are missing something in our measures. Indeed there are few studies
that have attempted to measure whether the use of ADR reduced parties’ time spent on litigation
or has positive consequences…sometimes lumped into the ‘qualitative’ benefits of using ADR But
they have real – and in principle, measurable – financial value. By ignoring them we may be
underestimating savings associated with court ADR.
Also noted is the absence of studies on the effect of ADR on time and resource allocation. Hensler
concludes consideration of this question by suggesting the perceptions may simply be wrong on several
accounts. “…individuals overestimate the likelihood of low-probability-high-negative consequence
events…Since every lawsuit has a small probability of going to trial and since the costs of trial can be
enormous, it would not be surprising for those costs to loom large in individual’s subjective calculus of
savings associated with ADR.” She also suggests that via ‘stereotyping’ trials as expensive and time
consuming “ADR practitioners themselves may enhance the likelihood that parties and their lawyers will
compare the costs of their ADR experience with the costs of a statistically unlikely trial.”
25
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Social work has a long history of appreciating the importance of understanding complex systems,
from individuals to large organizations. While social work has been theoretically oriented toward
a systems perspective, most research methods have a limited ability to represent and evaluate
nonlinear processes. Stressing empirically based practice while relying on methods that are
essentially limited to linear cause-effect relationships can have the unintended effect of actually
increasing the gap between social work research and practice. The goal of this symposium is to
present research that represents and evaluates nonlinear dynamics.
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From Kakalik 1996: “[RAND ICJ] found no strong statistical evidence that the mediation or neutral
evaluation programs, as instituted in the six districts studied, significantly affected time to disposition,
litigation costs, or attorney view of fairness or satisfaction with case management. The only significant
outcome is that these ADR programs appear to increase the likelihood of a monetary settlement.”
30
Also around 1996, a Federal Judicial Center (FJC) report to the U.S. Judicial Conference Committee on
Court Administration and Case Management documented significant savings in dispute resolution time and
cost in federal district court programs. See Donna Stienstra, et al, Report to The Judicial Conference
Committee on Court Administration and Case Management: A Study of Five Demonstration Programs
Established Under The Civil Justice Reform Act Of 1990 (Federal Judicial Ctr. 1997).
31
Note that correlation is not as strong as ascertaining “causality.”
32
J. Thibaut and R. Walker, Procedural Justice. New York: Wiley, 1975. These social psychologists are
likely the most influential in the development of the measure of “satisfaction with process” widely
employed in the mediation research community.
33
Resource Materials of the National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice, ABA, St. Paul, Minnesota, April, 1976.
34
Dana Baggett, TQM Project Coordinator in Maine.
A court is an organization that is filled with processes; therefore, TQM [which focuses on
improving processes] has potential and application in the court environment.
35
Philip B. Crosby, Quality is Free: The Art of Making Quality Certain, New American Library, New
York, NY, 1979.
36
Examples of the translation of the Total Quality Management movement into government, with examples
in the courts is found in: (a) David K. Carr, and Ian D. Littman,, Excellence in Government: Total Quality
Management in the 1990s, Coopers and Lybrand, Arlington, VA, 1990. (b) Regina Kay Brough, "Total
Quality Management in State Government," Journal of State Government, Jan.-Mar. 1992, pages 4-8. (c)
Steven Cohen, and Ronald Brand, Total Quality Management in Government: A Practical Guide for the
Real World, Jossey Bass Publishers, Inc., San Francisco, CA, 1993. (d) G. Ronald Gilbert, "Human
Resource Management Practices to Improve Quality: A Case Example of Human Resource Management
Intervention in Government," Human Resource Management Journal, Vol. 30, No. 2, pages 183-98. (e)
Stephen J. Harrison, and Ronald J. Stupak, "Total Quality Management: The Organizational Equivalent of
Truth in Public Administration, Theory and Practice," Public Administration Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 4
(Winter 1993), pages 416-29. (f) Henry Lefevre, ed., Government Quality and Productivity - Success
Stories (ASQC Quality Press, Milwaukee, WI, 1992). (g) David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, Reinventing
Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector, Addison-Wesley
Publishing, Co., Inc., Reading, MA, 1992. (h) A. K. Smith, "Total Quality Management in the Public
Sector, Part 1", Quality Progress, Vol. 26, No. , (June 1993), pages 45- . (i) A. K. Smith, "Total Quality
Management in the Public Sector, Part 2," Quality Progress, Vol. 26, July 1993, pages 57- . (j) Ronald J.
Stupak, and Rudolph B. Garrity, "Introduction," Public Administration Review, Vol. 16, No. 4, Winter
1993, pages 409-415. (k) James E Swiss, "Adapting Total Quality Management (TQM) To Government,"
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and John H. Reurink, "Customer Service in Public Administration," Public Administration Review, Vol.
51, May/June 1991, pages 263-269.
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Ward Bower, “In Search of Excellence: Applying TQM to a Legal Environment,” Law Practice
Management, vol. 19, no 3. April 1993, p. 22. “An estimated 400 of the Fortune 500 corporate law
departments are expected to be applying TQM by 1994.”
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H. Astor, Quality in Court Connected Mediation Programs: An Issues Paper (Australian Institute of
Judicial Administration Inc, 2001)
41
Alexander B. Aikman and Adam L. Fleischman, “Total Quality Management: Where the Courts are
Now,” State Court Journal, Winter 1994.
Minneapolis is the leading local government unit cited for success with TQM, but Phoenix,(a)
Milwaukee, (b) and Los Angeles (c) also claim significant successes. And, as indicated by the
quotations at the beginning of this chapter, courts that have tried TQM also are finding positive
results. The Tulsa Municipal Criminal Court has documented improvements in juror attitudes
toward service and the court. The Los Angeles Municipal Court has documented a marked
decrease in waiting time and customer complaints since instituting its TQM program. Robert
Quist of that court says: "In the past, the mentality was for courts to search for ways of dealing
with angry customers; under TQM, the focus shifts to doing a good job so that there are no angry
customers.…Suzie White of the Administrative Office of the Probate and Family Court in
Massachusetts calls TQM ‘a common sense model for management.’
Citing (a) James P. Garrison, “Phoenix: A Quality City,” Public Risk, May/June 1993, page 42. (b)
Jonathan Walters, “The Cult of Total Quality,” Governing, vol.5 no. 8, May 1992, page 38, 42. (c) Laura
Jessee, “Productivity: Part of the Governmental Culture in Los Angeles, “ Government Finance Review,
December 1990, page 15.
42
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and Administrators (Denver: National Center for State Courts, 1994).
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Roselle Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation in General Civil Cases: What We Know from Empirical
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46
Jeffrey Senger, Deputy Senior Counsel for Dispute Resolution, Evaluation of ADR in United States
Attorney Cases, United States Attorney Bulletin, November 2000, pg. 25.
47
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then try to shoot for the bull’s eye.
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The Visiting Committee on Management in the Courts - Report to Chief Justice Margaret Marshall,
March 2003. [http://www.mass.gov/courts/courtreformfinal.pdf]
49
National Center for State Courts, Total Quality Management in the Courts, 1994.
[KIS_AdmOCtTQMinCts.pdf]. Here is an excerpt from the Conclusion:
Because TQM has been identified in the general media with the resurgence of the American
automobile industry and several other large manufacturers have had marked success with TQM,
some in the judicial branch have decided it is not appropriate for courts. The early pioneers with
TQM among courts have demonstrated that is not true. TQM can apply and be helpful in courts.
Courts that have started down the path of changing their court's management culture share the
enthusiasm of their private sector counterparts about the value and merits of TQM. It is not a fad
and it is not something that will disappear if we wait long enough. It is hard for some to think of
the people who come through the courthouse doors-other than attorneys, perhaps-as "customers,"
but they are the objects and recipients of the service courts provide and thus are customers.
Rather than diminishing the courts' mission of providing justice in individual cases and being
perceived as providing justice, TQM can materially improve and enhance courts' service and at
the same time enhance their capacity to fulfill that mission.
50
Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the “Vanishing Trial”: The Growth and Impact of “Alternative
Dispute Resolution”, Prepared for the Symposium on the Vanishing Trial, Journal of Empirical Legal
Research (July 20, 2004).
51
Rudolph H. Ehrenberg, Jr. and Ronald J. Stupak, "Administrative Theories Applicable to the
Implementation of Total Quality Management in Public Sector and Service Organizations," (An Occasional
Paper Series of the Institute for Court Management of the National Center for State Courts), 1991.
Many in courts who consider TQM will do so because of the prospect of budget savings.
That subject deserves further discussion. The Federal Quality Institute reports that studies show
that $4 to $5 are saved for every dollar invested in TQM…
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The approach has merit, but it is not clear how many of these savings showed up as reductions in
line items in (the) budget. In government, not all improvements in quality involve fiscal savings.
The city of Phoenix cites two programs as positive examples of the benefits of TQM that did not
produce any savings
Even in state-funded judicial systems, savings representing even as much as say ten percent of a
non-personnel item, will seem small next to the dollar savings achievable by other government
units or larger corporations. The biggest non-personnel items in trial courts' budgets are court
reporting transcript fees, jury fees, and indigent defense costs. While all of these are susceptible to
savings and other out-o-fpocket costs can be limited or reduced, the magnitude of real-dollar
savings will be limited unless a court identifies new processes that require fewer staff. This can
happen and real dollar savings can be achieved as a result, although the nature of public-sector
employment is that those filling the eliminated positions often will be reassigned rather than
terminated.
Personnel are reduced through attrition far more often than through lay offs. Courts' benefits from
TQM are likely to be: improved productivity that will defer or eliminate future staff increases or
enable a court to remain current with fewer staff,.
52

National Center for State Courts with acknowledgment to the State Justice Institute (SJI), Report on
Trends in the State Courts 1999-2000 Edition, 2000.
[http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/KIS_CtFutu_Trends99-00_Pub.pdf]
TQM, RIP?
In the 1993-94 edition, we reported that total quality management (TQM) “is not a fad and…is
not something that will disappear if we wait long enough.”* While courts are still very interested
in providing quality customer service to court users and other goals of TQM, TQM is not
necessarily the means that courts use to accomplish such goals. Newer processes such as strategic
planning, data mining, and futures studies seem to have replaced TQM’s grassroots planning
techniques.
* quoting Alexander Aikman, Total Quality Management in the Courts: A Handbook for Judicial
Policy Makers and Administrators (Denver: National Center for State Courts, 1994).
53
Ann L. MacNaughton, Law Practice in the 21st Century: Assisted Negotiation and Multidisciplinary
Problem-Solving, American Bar Association, Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Texas, 1999. The
presentation describes the trend toward cooperative business solutions and its implications for law practice
in the 21st Century.
54
R. J. MacCoun, Unintended Consequences of Court Arbitration: A Cautionary Tale from New Jersey,
RAND Institute for Civil Justice, RP-134 (originally published in The Justice System Journal, Vol. 14, No.
2, 1991), 1992. “Arbitration programs are expected to reduce delays and costs by providing a more efficient
substitute for trial, but because most disputes are already resolved without adjudication, an arbitration
program is likely to divert more cases from settlement than from trial.”
55
Sandra Azar, Jack Demick, Peter Gibbs, Permanency Mediation Pilot Programs: Impact and Outcomes,
Center for Adoption Research, University of Massachusetts, report to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, June 30, 2000.
56
Hedeen, Timothy, “The Evolution and Evaluation of Community Mediation: Limited Research Suggests
Unlimited Promise,” Conflict Resolution Quarterly 22(1&2): 101-133, 2004, pg. 124.
[http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/109801328/PDFSTART]
An additional measure of cost efficiency may be derived from the cost of services saved, that is,
those services that were not required or delivered due to the successful resolution of concerns
through mediation. Just as the research on the Durham center identified the potential court costs
saved, another study has found that police referrals can lead to a decrease in return calls for
service (Charkoudian, 2001), leading to direct cost savings for municipalities.
57
Charkoudian, L. “Economic Analysis of Interpersonal Conflict and Community Mediation.” Unpublished
doctoral dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 2001.
58
Ian Heisey, Building Stronger Communities Through Mediation, Shelterforce Online, Issue #136,
July/August 2004, a publication of the National Housing Institute.
[http://www.nhi.org/online/issues/136/mediation.html]
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Mediation offers an alternative to placing calls to the police and seeking prosecution or
retaliation against neighbors. Residents learn to resolve their disputes in an assertive and
nonviolent way, finding ways to address their differences without relying on law enforcement for
help.
When mediation is used to manage neighbor or community conflicts, police are able to devote
their attention to more pressing law enforcement matters. A 2001study by Dr. Lorig Charkoudian,
“Economic Analysis of Interpersonal Conflict and Mediation,” looked at the Community
Mediation Program of Baltimore and the Baltimore Police Department and found that mediation
saved the police department time and money. Specifically, with mediation, the police department
saved an average of nine calls and over four hours of patrol time within a six-month period.
59
David Green, Alison McClellan, Uncertainty, risk and children’s futures, Family Matters, No.64 Autumn
2003. [http://www.aifs.gov.au/institute/pubs/fm2003/fm64/dg.pdf]
In this opinion piece we argue that, as the Western world undergoes a period of profound
economic and social change, insufficient attention is being paid to how that change, and the
consequential risks and uncertainties that are generated, could be managed by governments to
strengthen and protect families.
We maintain that the material insecurities associated with change are likely to undermine the
strength of relationships, so important to family stability and to children’s development. We also
argue that the way family and children’s services are funded and delivered means that these
problems of uncertainty and relationship instability are compounded.
While vulnerable families have always been subject to both risk and uncertainty, the modern
welfare state softened their impacts in the interests of stability, equity and optimising the futures
for children. We contend that, in a period of profound change, the management of risk currently
delivers certainty to those with social power and secure in their inclusion, at the expense of those
unable to control their own participation in today’s economy (Taylor-Gooby 2000). This
distribution of risk and uncertainty is of particular importance to parenting, which more than ever
is a longterm project, requiring a firm and secure foundation in the present (Bourdieu 1998, cited
by Bauman 2002: 177).
In terms of outcomes, these management processes result in policy shifts from collectivising the
response to uncertainty to relocating it within families, individuals and localities; from solving
social problems to managing them; and from program approaches to social problems based on
treatment to approaches based on harm minimisation (Garland 2001). And at the level of practice,
governments are adopting radically different approaches to the funding and delivery of services,
including the transfer of the responsibility for the delivery of services to contracted providers. All
these changes have implications for the distribution of risk.
Citing (a) Taylor-Gooby, P. “Risk and welfare”, in P. Taylor-Gooby (ed.) Risk, Trust and Welfare,
Macmillan Press Ltd, London, 2000. (b) Z. Bauman, Society Under Siege, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2002.
(c) D. Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 2001.
60
Amber Hardin, The State of Community Mediation Report on 2004 Data, National Association for
Community Mediation.
61
Ibid.
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An example of a strong community partnership is in Fall River. [http://www.gfrpartners.com/healthycity.htm]
Two example priority actions of Fall River involve preventing relationship violence and eliminating homelessness.
These are reasonable initiatives for community mediation programs to join; community mediation can leverage these
existing activities. For example, the privately-funded Katie Brown Educational Program [http://www.kbep.org/]
[http://www.gfrpartners.com/05KatieBrown.html is providing education to hundreds of Fall River students in an effort
to prevent relationship violence. Fall River has joined a growing list of cities around the country that are participating
in a national movement to end homelessness. [http://www.gfrpartners.com/05HomelessTaskForce.html] The project is
based on concepts developed by the Federal Interagency Council on Homelessness [http://www.ich.gov/] and the
National Alliance to End Homelessness [http://www.endhomelessness.org].
63

Clear, Todd R. and David R. Karp. The Community Justice Ideal: Preventing Crime and
Achieving Justice, Westview Press, Chicago, 2000.

MA Office of Dispute Resolution, Working Paper, January 2006. Version 6.doc

40

64

Todd Clear (John Jay College of Criminal Justice, USA), Community Justice as Public Safety, Keynote
Paper presented at the Probation and Community Corrections: Making the Community Safer Conference,
convened by the Australian Institute of Criminology and the Probation and Community Corrections
Officers' Association Inc., Perth, 23-24 September 2002. [http://www.aic.gov.au/conferences/probation/]
(citing Clear and Karp)
65
Thomas O. Main, University of the Pacific McGeorge School of Law, ADR: The New Equity, Working
Paper 479, 2005. [http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/479]
66
Douglas M. Gane, The Birth of a New Equity, 67 The Solicitors’ Journal & Wkly. Rptr. 572, 572 (May
26, 1923).
67
(a) Albie M. Davis, “An interview with Mary Parker Follett, Negotiation Journal, (July 1989). (b) Albie
M. Davis, “Follett on facts: Timely advice from an ADR pioneer,” Negotiation Journal, (April 1991), pp.
131-138. (c) Albie M. Davis, “Liquid Leadership: The Wisdom of Mary Parker Follett (1868 - 1933)”,
August 1997. [http://sunsite.utk.edu/FINS/Mary_Parker_Follett/Fins-MPF-03.txt.].
68
Mary Parker Follett, The New State: Group Organization the Solution of Popular Government, Longman
Green and Co., New York, 1918., (now carried by Penn State University Press).
[http://sunsite.utk.edu/FINS/Mary_Parker_Follett/Fins-MPF-01.html]. In Chapter XVI,
[http://sunsite.utk.edu/FINS/Mary_Parker_Follett/XVI.txt], Democracy Not "Liberty" and "Equality": Our
Political Dualism she writes:
There has been long a kind of balance theory prevalent: everything that seems to have to do with
the one is put on one side, everything that has to do with the many, on the other, and one side is
called individuality and freedom, and the other, society, constraint, authority. Then the balancing
begins: how much shall we give up on one side and how much on the other to keep the beautiful
equilibrium of our daily life? How artificial such balancing sounds! We are beginning to know
now that our freedom depends not on the weakness but on the strength of our government, our
government being the expression of a united people. We are freer under our present sanitary laws
than without them; we are freer under compulsory education than without it. A highly organized
state does not mean restriction of the individual but his greater liberty. The individual is
restricted in an unorganized state. A greater degree of social organization means a more
complex, a richer, broader life, means more opportunity for individual effort and individual
choice and individual initiative. The test of our liberty is not the number of limitations put upon
the powers of the state. The state is not an extra-will. If we are the state we welcome Our
liberty.”
69
Hedeen, Timothy, “The Evolution and Evaluation of Community Mediation: Limited Research Suggests
Unlimited Promise,” Conflict Resolution Quarterly 22(1&2): 101-133, 2004. Hedeen characterizes the
supplanting of degrading social institutions with community mediation centers as follows: “The reliance on
courts to resolve concerns was a product of many social trends. It was a project of the Department of
Justice to pilot the concept of mediation for low-level civil and criminal matters. It began in 1978 and many
of the centers created through the project live on. The final report on the NJC Field Test explained:
The courts have not actively sought to become the central institution for dispute resolution; rather
the task has fallen to them by default as the significance and influence of other institutions has
waned over the years... Many of the disputes which are presently brought to the courts would have
been settled in the past by the family, the church, or the informal community leadership. While the
current role of these societal institutions in resolving interpersonal disputes is in doubt, many
citizens take their cases to the courts.
citing Cook, R. F., Roehl, J. A., and Sheppard, D. I. Neighborhood Justice Centers Field
Test: Final Evaluation Report. Washington, D.C. Department of Justice, 1980. pg. 2.
70
Such an apparent “variety” of cost savings is typically well fit by a log normal distribution, or a
multiplicative log normal distribution. The preclusion of cost overrun in the contract model would be
accommodated by a truncated log normal distribution.
71
Supreme Judicial Court / Trial Court Standing Committee on Dispute Resolution for the Chief Justice
for Administration and Management of the Trial Court, Report to the Legislature on The Impact of
Alternative Dispute Resolution on the Massachusetts Trial Court, February 2, 1998.
• Reduce backlog of older cases;
• Reduce case disposition time;
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• Expedite particular categories of cases;
• Save judicial resources;
• Reduce litigant costs;
• Product high litigant satisfaction;
• Produce high attorney satisfaction;
• Produce high judicial satisfaction;
• Increase pre-event dispositions;
• Streamline litigation;
• Find the best forum for resolving the presented and underlying issues;
• Empower citizens to resolve their own disputes while developing conflict resolution skills that
reduce further conflict;
• Produce better outcomes;
• Involve the bar and public in effective problem-solving and the administration of justice
72
Susan Jeghelian, Executive Director, Massachusetts Office of Dispute Resolution, Stakeholder Input and
Recommendations for Design for June 28th ADR Conference, Memorandum to Honorable Robert Mulligan
Chief Justice for Administration & Management of the Trial Court and Honorable Gail Perlman, First
Justice, Hampshire Division, Probate & Family Court, Chair of the Trial Court Standing Committee on
Dispute Resolution, May 20, 2005. The following are findings based on interviews with court and program
representatives regarding objectives for court ADR.
Some, but not all, department and approved program representatives articulated goals for court
ADR. Many Standing Committee members were not clear on the overall goals of the system for
court-connected ADR. There seems to be a lack of clarity around this. Some programs expressed
an interest in talking about goals with individual courts in a more systematic way --such as an
annual meeting to check in, see how things are going from both the court’s and the program’s
perspectives, and establish goals for the coming year.
The following is a list of the goals for Court ADR noted by Stakeholders:
Case Management for the Court
• Settling cases through ADR and earlier settlements through ADR
• Resolving cases as early as possible through the most appropriate method
• Honing issues and enhancing case processing through ADR
• Streamlining case management; enhancing efficiency of court system
• Focus priorities on courts/case types of greatest need i.e., back logs (old cases); divisions/courts
in the worst shape (look at statistical caseload data to determine this)
• Increase number of cases resolving through ADR
• Increase number of referrals to ADR
• Expand ADR more courts, wider range of case types and ADR processes
• Having court approved ADR programs in every division that wants them – some do not
• Expanding ADR to other case types (e.g., minor criminal cases in District Court; pro se
cases/restraining orders in Superior Court)
Quality Alternatives for Litigants and Peaceful Communities
• Offering a range of viable options for resolution to litigants
• Providing affordable and accessible mediation services
• Increased satisfaction in how conflicts get resolved
• Better administration of justice
• Serving pro se parties effectively
• Empowering litigants to resolve their own disputes in a professional environment; help litigants
feel a part of the process – control over decisions, not just judge driven
• Bringing together parties that do not often agree (e.g., DSS and parents)
• Reducing the costs associated with litigation
• Promoting improved satisfaction of litigants and members of the bar
• Providing options to meet needs of wide range of litigants and issues
• Increased compliance and create enduring resolutions which can preserve long-term relationships
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Building Greater Acceptance of and Capacity for ADR as Core Function of Court
• Integration and support of ADR at all levels of the court
• ADR is treated as a core function of the court - not an add on and funding as such
• Judges, clerks and other court personnel who know about ADR, how to use ADR and how to
work with approved programs in their court
• Increased visibility of ADR & ADR programs in the court house
• Increasing public awareness of ADR in the courts
Program goals drive decisions about design, structure, funding and other resource allocation, and
serve as the basis for program evaluation. Goals should be clearly articulated and prioritized.
73
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court/Trial Court Standing Committee on Dispute Resolution in
cooperation with the SJC Public Information Office, A Guide to Court-Connected Alternative Dispute
Resolution Services, section: What are the potential advantages of using court-connected
Dispute resolution services? pg. 10.
[http://www.mass.gov/courts/courtsandjudges/courts/supremejudicialcourt/ccadr0601large.pdf]
Savings of Time and Money
An average lawsuit in America can take over three years to reach trial or
settlement. Often court-connected dispute resolution proceedings can
resolve cases in days or even hours, saving the parties from having to attend
multiple court appearances. Parties can schedule an appointment with a
court-connected dispute resolution service provider as soon as they choose
their preferred dispute resolution process and provider. By resolving the
issue early on, both parties avoid some of the costs associated with pre-trial
litigation.
Finality
Resolution of disputes achieved through binding methods of court-connected
dispute resolution is final, eliminating the long and costly process of appeal.
Compliance
Studies show that parties are more likely to adhere to court-connected dispute
resolutions than to court-imposed decisions.
Custom-Made Solutions
Some court-connected dispute resolution proceedings, such as mediation,
allow the parties to create their own solutions tailored to their specific needs.
These voluntary court-connected dispute resolution processes often achieve
resolution through the sharing of information and the development of mutual
understanding of each party’s concerns.
It is interesting to compare this with the guiding principles published in Report of the (Commonwealth of
Massachusetts) Supreme Judicial Court/Trial Court Standing Committee on Dispute Resolution “Dispute
Resolution in the Courts: A Plan to Promote Access, Choice, and Integrity in Court-Connected Dispute
Resolution, June 18, 1996. The guiding principles are quality, integrity, accessibility, informed choice of
process and provider, self-determination, timely services, diversity, and qualification of neutrals.
74
The Guide pg. 11-12.
Preservation or Enhancement of Long-Term Relationships
Often disputes are caused by underlying issues, and court-connected dispute
resolution processes offer the opportunity to create an enduring resolution
that will satisfy everyone’s goals. Some conflicts are the result of deep differences
between parties who nevertheless must sustain ongoing working relationships. For these disputes,
some court-connected dispute resolution processes offer the opportunity to examine and resolve
these differences so that the parties’ short-term and long-term goals may be achieved
75
Milan Zafirovski, Some Amendments to Social Exchange Theory: A Sociological Perspective, Theory
and Science, 2003. [http://theoryandscience.icaap.org/content/vol004.002/01_zafirovski.html ] citing
Raymond Boudon, The Unintended Consequences Of Social Action, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1982.
pg. 9.
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“…homo sociologicus is “an advance over homo oeconomicus. Homo sociologicus is an
intentional actor, endowed with a set of preferences, seeking acceptable ways of realising his
objectives, conscious of the degree of control over the elements of the situation (of the structural
constraints), acting in the light of limited information and in a situation of uncertainty.”
The key feature of the homo sociologicus model is an acknowledgement of limited rationality.
76
The evolution from the Homo economicus model to the Homo sociologicus model, put forth by
sociologists is reflected in a transition of the economic theory of Adam Smith to that proposed by John
Nash. Paraphrasing succinctly: “According to Adam Smith’s theory, in competition, individual ambition
serves the common good´, this is incomplete, ``the best result will come from everybody in the group doing
what's best for himself, and the group´´. For this finding, backed up by mathematical rigor, John Nash was
awarded the Nobel Prize. Avner Greif, “Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: Historical and
Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies,” The Journal of Political Economy,
(October 1994);
77
Elizabeth S. Rolph and Erik Moller, Evaluating Agency Alternative Dispute Resolution Programs: A
Users' Guide to Data Collection and Use, RAND Institute for Civil Justice, MR-534, 1995. “Manual
created to assist those with responsibility for evaluating federal agency alternative dispute resolution
programs; discusses issues in designing evaluations, lays out approaches to data collection, provides sample
data analysis plans, and includes a number of prototype data collection instruments.”
78
Melinda Ostermeyer, and Susan Keilitz, Monitoring and Evaluating Court-Based Dispute Resolution
Programs, National Center for State Courts, SJI, 1997.
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